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Summary findings
Since  the carly 1970s, industrial countries  have enacted  regulation,  little empirical work has been  done abIotit  the
(or amended)  many environmental  laws and regulations  effect of current  monitoring  strategies on pollution
to control  and improve  air and water  quality.  D)eveloping  emissions.
countries  are increasingly enacting sinlilar legislation.  lIut  I.aplante and  Rilstone supply an empirical frameworL
imposing a ceiling on a plant's emissions does not  for measuring the impact  of environmental  inspectiznsn
guarantee  reduecd  emissions or an improved  on plant emissions. They apply it to pulp and paper
environment.  Ensuring the attainment  of the  regulation's  plants in Quebec  for which reliable data were available.
objectives requires  monitoring  the behavior  of the  The results suggest that both inspections  and the threat
regulated  facility and enforcing environmental  stand;  s.  of inspections  reduce pollution  emissions. They also
Most of the  literature  in environmental  economics  is  show that  a plant's decision  whether  to report  its
theoretical  and simply assumes that polluters  comply  emissions levels  to the regulator  is not random.
with regulations.  Although monitoring  and  enforcement  Inspections improve  the frequency  of reporting.
problems  are clearly a pitfall of environmental
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Sincc the beginning of the  1970s, govenmments  of developed countries have enacted (or
amended)  a large number  of environrmental  laws and regulations  directed  mainly al controlling and
improving air and  water quality. Governments of  developing countries are  also  increasingly
enacting similar  legislation. However, imposing a  ceiling on  a  plant's emissions does  not
necessarily  imply that emissions will fall and that environmental  quality will improve. Indeed, for
the objectives of the regulation to be attained, the behaviour of the regulated facility has to be
monitored,  and enviromnental  standards  have  to be enforced.
Monitoring and enforcement  issues have attracted relatively little research effort. Indeed,
most  of  tthe literature in  environmental economics simply makes the  (implicit or  explicit)
assumption that polluters comply with the regulation. Moreover,  the existing literature on these
issues is for the most part theoretical.  Hence,  although it has long been recognized  that monitoring
and enforcement problems are an important pitfall of envirorunental  regulation, little empirical
work has been done on the impact  of current  monitoring  strategies  on pollution  emissions.
The purpose of this paper is twofold.  First, we extend the work of Magat and Viscusi
(1990) to  produce a  methodology and an empirical framework for measuring the  impact of
environmental  inspections  on plants' emissions. Second,  we apply this methodology  to pulp and
paper plants in Quebec from which reliable data were available. Our results suggest that both
inspections  and the threat of inspections  have a strong  negative impact  on pollution  emissions. We
also show evidence  that the decision  for a plant to report or not to report  its level of emissions to the
regulator  is not random and that inspections  improve  the frequency  of reporting.
Until recently, there have  been no data which would allow us to draw any inferences  about
the responses  of  plants to inspections  in developing  countries. The current paper should therefore
be considered  the initial round of a larger work program.  It develops  the relevant methodology  and
applies it to a situation  where good measures  are available.  In the future,  PRDEI will pursue similar
work in several  developing  countries.
21)  INTRODUCIION
Since the beginning of the  1970s, governments of developed countries have enacted (or
amended) a  arge number of environmental  laws and regulations  directed mainly at controlling  and
improving air and water quality. However, imposing a ceiling on a plant's emissions does not
necessarily imply that emissions will fall and that environmental  quality will improve.'  For the
objectives of the regulation to be attained, the behaviour of the regulated community has to be
monitored, and environmental  standards have to be enforced.  However, while a large amount of
resources  is  devoted  to  designing  environmental  regulations,  defining  and  negotiating
environmental standards with the regulated industries,  it has been acknowledged,  both in Canada
and the United States, that the resources  devoted  to monitoring  and enforcement  are insufficient.
What is missing is a commitment  of resources to checking up on
whether those covered by the law and regulations  are doing (or not
doing) what is required of (or forbidden  to) them. (Russell, 1990,
p.243)
This lack of resources  has forced the regulator  to rely on a system by which a polluter (I) is
presumed to comply with the environmental  standard  if it is using the appropriate  emissions  control
technology (initial  compliance)  and (2) has to  report at regular interval its cmissions  of the
regulated  pollutants  (self-monitoring). Audits of plants and on-site inspections  are rare events. For
example, Russell (1983)  notes that measurement  of the discharges  of large sources of air pollution
occurs on average  only once every eight and a half months.  Wasserman  (I 984) notes  that experted
inspection  frequencies  for minor sources are bi-annual.  With respect to hazardous  waste disposal,
less than 10% of the regulated facilities were reached  at all in 1986 (General  Accounting Office,
1987). In Quebec (Canada), while 59 pulp and paper plants were in operation during the period
1985-1990,  there has been a total of only 54 on-site  inspections  in the industry.
The present  system does not put pressure  on agency policy makers  to
make the large investments in monitoring and personnel that are
required to  make  the  tedious and  unending work  of  credible
enforcement  a bureaucratic  reality. (Ackerman  arid Stewart, 1985,  p.
1333)
The same holds true when effluent  charges  or tradeable  permits are introduced.
2  Enforcement  can take various forms: orders, fines, loss of market value or reputation,  etc.
See Dewees (1990), Muoghalu et al. (1990) and Laplante and Lanoie (1994) for more
details.
3Monitoring  and  eniborcement issues  lhave attracted  relatively  little  research  CeTort.?
Moreover, most ol  this elTort has beeni theorctical.)  E,xcept for l)eily  and Gray (1991) and Magat
and Viscusi ( 1990).  we can only nlOtC  the mere absence of*  empirical  analysis.5
Magat amd Viscusi (1990. hencelborth  MV) have estimated the impact ol  inspections on the
sel/-reported discharges of biological oxygen demand (BOD) by the pulp and paper industry in Ihe
United States. Since the pulp and paper industry is the largest discharger of BOI). it has been the
focus of a considerable amount of regulatory ellTrt. ThIlis  explains that there is, lor this industry, an
extensive  data  base  on  BOD  dischargc  measurements  per  plant  (the  EPA  Permnit Compliance
System. also known as the 13CS  data base) and on on-site sampling inspections by the regulator. 6
Sampling inspections are cnnsidered to be the regulator's ultimate device to assess compliance with
the  standard  and  give  credibility  to  the  sell-reportinig procedure.  MV  have  found  that  each
inspection reduces the mean value of rcported discharges of BOD  by approximately  20%. They
also found that inspections have a pcnnanent effect on discharges.
The  purpose  of this  study  is  to measure  the impact  of  inspections  on the  self-reported
emissions levels of  plants in the pulp and paper industry in Quebec. Our analysis differs from MV
on a number of important accounts. Firstl MV measured the impact of inspections on the absolute
level of emissions as well as on the status of compliance of the plants, i.e. whether  plants comply
or do  not  comply  witlh the standard.  However,  to  the extent  that  environrmental quality  is the
ultimate concem, the interest is not necessarily whetheT  inspections induce compliance,  but instead
whether inspections effect the level of emissions exceeding the standard. Indeed, if inspections do
not induce a plant to comply with the standard, they may nonetheless induce the plant to reduce the
amount of emissions  by which  it exceeds the standard. Hence, a plant's  compliance  status may
we note, along with Cropper and Oates (1992), that most of the literature in environmental
economics  simply makes the (implicit or explicit) assumption that polluters comply  with
the regulation.
4  Among others, see Beavis and Dobbs (1987). lIarrington (1988), Lee (1984), Linder and
McBride (1984), Russell et al. (1986), and Tietenberg (1992)).
4  Fisheries have attracted a certain number of empirical analysis (see, among others, Sutinen
and  Andersen  (1985).  Anderson and  Lee (1986).  and Furlong  (1991)).  Deily and  Gray
(1991)  examines  the  EPA's  enforcement  activities  "for  evidence  that  enforcement  was
responsive  to the possible economic  disruption from plant  closings"  (p. 260).  Deily and
Gray claim that their paper is "thefirsl  empirical study of the EPA's enforcement activity at
the plant level" (p. 260).
6  A "sampling  inspection" is an inspection where the regulator samples the plant's effluents
and measures the BOD content of the samples. Jther  types of monitoring activities are also
performed. See Magat and Viscusi (1990, p. 338) for more details.
4remaini  uncllaiiged  as tlic result of inspcctions. and yet environmenmal  quality improve.  MV wrotc:
'Unrbrtunately,  it is not possible  to conistruct a reliable  nieasure of' the amounit of' pollution  in
excess  ol' the perrmitted an-ount since data pertaining to the level specified in thc pennit  are niot
available from thie  Pt'S  data base" (p. 345).  In our data set, we do have access to the standard  per
plant. I lencc, wc are able to test lor the impact ol inspectionis on the level ol' emissioins r elhifie to
the standard.
Second., thCe  Imost obvious  question whicih arises  in  the context  of' the current  analysis
concerns  the possible  endogencity  of' inispectionis.  Indeed, whlile past  inspections  are given,  the
regulator's  current decisioni to inspect a plant may itself be e'fected by the plant's  eniissions  level.
1'herelore,  one miglht reasonably expect that in the current period, it is the perceived probability or
threat ol'an  inspection (rather than an inspection per se) which is the variable ol' interest.  In other
words, both  inspections and  the probability of  an inspection  may  have an effect on emissions.
MV  have  rejected  the  hypothesis  that  current  inspections  arc  exogenous  and  perform  their
estimatioris usinig  only lagged inspection variables.
Interviews with employces of the Quebec Ministry of the Ensi ronment strongly suggest that
in any given period. the plants chosen to be inspected are not randomly picked, and in fact, that the
probability of an inspection may be inversely related to the number of previous visits. This reflects
the Ministry's desire to visit as many plants as possible. From a statistical perspective, this amounts
to sampling witlout  replacement. Our interviews also indicate that changes in production  capacity
may  trigger  an  inspection.7 Consequently.  we  estimate  an  "ins;pections equation"  in  which
inspections are a function (among others) of a variable indicating the number of inspections which
have been conducted at the plant prior to the period of reporting as well as capacity. In our sample
of analysis, we also  reject the exogeneity of current  inspections. We then re-estimate  our basic
model by instrumental  variables using expected inspections as  instruments. Our results  strongly
suggest that the threat  of an inspection as well as actual inspections have an impact on pollution
emissions.
Thi-d. though the EPA Permit Compliance System lists 194 sources with BOD discharges,
only  77  of  these  sources  submitted  discharge  monitoring  reports  to  iae  EPA.  If  the  missing
information is not governed by a random process, this obviously raises the possibility of a selection
bias. MV are aware of this problem and inform the reader that "[our] results need to be interpreted
as  estimates  of the  response to  EPA inspections of  fim-s whose discharge  levels  are  regularly
reported to the EPA's  national data base" (p. 342). We also face the same issue in Quebec. Indeed,
as mentioned above, there were 59 plants in operation over the period 1985-1990. In principle, as
required  by the regulation,  each of these plants  must submit a  monthly discharge  report  to  the
Ministry  of the Environment.  However, only 46 of the 59 plants filed reports  on a regular basis
during the sample period. E  In order to allowv  for sample selection problems, we compute a simple
7  In such cases, the purpose of the inspection  is to verify whether the change in capacity
affects compliance  with the standard and/or environmental quality.
For some of these 46 plants. a few observation points were missing. These were smoothed
over using forecasts from 12th-order univariate autoregressions.
5binary clhoice  model ol' reporting and then augmcnt our basic model with a  correction term
suggested by I-leckniian  ( 1  979). Our results suggest  that inspections  havc  an impact not only on the
levels of  'emissions, but also on reporting  frequencies.9  Hence,  the bencfits of inspections  are not
simply that they reduce pollution emissions; they also providc the regulator with morm  information
by inducing  more  frequunt  reporting.
F'inall.  we estimate the impact  of inspections  not only on the reported discharges  of BOD,
but also on  reported discharges of total suspended solids (TSS). It should be noted that the
technology  used to abate BO3D  differs from the one used to reduce TSS. It is found that inspections
do  not have the same effect on  the emissions of  these two pollutants. Tlhis suggests that a
monitoring strategy cannot be developed  irrespective  of the pollutant (and therefore  the abatement
technology)  thal is the object of the regulation.  The rest of the paper proceeds  as follows. In Section
11,  we present and describe our data set. In Section III, models and results are presented. We
conclude in Section IV.
11)  THE INDUSTRY AND THE DATA SET" 0
(A) The industry
The pulp arid paper industry  is an important  economic agent in the province of Quebec. In
1989, more than 31 000 individuals were employed by the industry which paid more than one
billion dollars in wages and salaries (Quebec, 1990). In that same year, it was estimated that the
industry's capital made up 25% of the capital  of the entire manufacturing  industry  in the province.
Newsprint represents  by far the most important  output with 56% of  total production (L'Association
des Industries Forestieres du Quebec, 1991).  The province of Quebec is the largest producer of
newsprint in Canada with 45% of Canadian production and one of the largest in the world with
14% cf  world production in 1989. Most of its output (73%) is exported  to the United States; this
represents  20% of Quebec's total exports (Quebec, 1990).
If the industry is a major contributor  to Quebec's economic activity, it is also one of the
most important  sources of conventional  pollutants.'" The BOD load produced by the industry is
MV do address non-reporting  although  not with a formal model. They test whether or not
there is a statistically  significant  difference  in the fiequency of reporting  before and after an
inspection, for the  77 plants of their sample. They find that inspections increase the
frequency  of reporting  of those plants.
'°  For a more detailed discussion of the industry and the regulation,  see Nemetz (1986) and
Sinclair  (1991).
"  These include BOD and TSS. Conventional  pollutants do not include  toxic emissions such
as dioxins  and furans.
6estimated to represent more than 60% of the total BOD load produced by the manufacturing
industry in Qudbec. TI'his  represenls thc cquiivalent  of the BOD produced by approximately 15
million individuals. Hence, one may expect that a reduction in the production ol  conventionial
pollutants by the pulp and paper industry would have  a significant impact on water quality in the
province. This presumably explains that so much attention has been dcvoted to thc emissions
control activities of the industry.
In Canada, jurisdiction ovcr water pollution control (and more gcnerally over pollution
control) is shared bv the federal and provincial  goveLnments.  The basis of the ovcrlap rclies on the
Constitution Act of  1867.12  Insofar as water pollution is concerned, the fcderal government has
played an important role through its Fisheries Act'3 under which it has introduced the Pulp and
Paper Effluent Reguiations'" in  1971. Similarly, the  government of Quebec, pursuant to  its
Environmental  Quality  Act'  5, has introduced the RNglement  sur les fabriques  de pdtes el  papiers (I  .
As of May 1992, new federal and provincial regulations  were introduced for the pulp and paper
industry whereby new emissions standards for TSS, BOD, toxicity, dioxins and furans have been
defined. The standards contained in the provincial regulation are at least as stringent as those
contained  in the federal  regulation.' 7 However,  for the period covered by our sample of data (1985-
1990), only the Quebec regulation contained standards for BOD and TSS (and not on toxicity).
Hence, only the latter is relevant for the current study. These standards are uniform and apply to
every  plant in the industry. They are set in kilograms per ton  of production. It is therefore
important  to understand  that the total amount of BOD and TSS that a plant can emit in any given
12  The invol  vement  of the federal government  in matters of environmental  protection  is made
possible through its jurisdiction over fisheries, harbours, criminal law, and its residual
power to legislate for the peace, order and good government of Canada. The appropriate
roles and responsibilities  of  federal and provincial go-ernments are the  subject of an
everlasting  debate (see, for example, Kennett (1991)).
13  Revised Statutes  of Canada, 1970,  c. F-14.
14  C.R.C. 1978.  c. 830.
15  L.R.Q., c. Q-2.
16  R.R.Q., 1981,  c. Q-2,  r. 12.
7  These regulations were preceded by the adoption of an administrative  agreement which
makes the Quebec  government  the primary agent  in dealing with the industry  on
environmental  issues. In particular,  the Quebec  government  is solely respoiisible  for
collecting  data on pollution  emissions.  The federal  government  will have ongoing  access to
the information  thus compiled  and is therefore  able  to oversee  the plants' compliance  with
the federal regulation.  A plant that is not complying  with the provincial  regulation  (and
therefore  not complying  with the federal  regulation)  may face enforcement  actions from
both levels of government.
7period  is u  lunction  ole  its output productioni during that  period: dhC  greater  its  production.  the
greater  is  the  allowable  discharge.  A  plant's  compliance  witlh the  regulation  is  assessed  by
coimparing the allowable discharge willt the total load reported bv tile plant."
(13)  'Ilic data  set
According  to the Rfg/lem7eint  sur  lesj,/&briques  de  p61  es el papiers,  plants  are required  to
submit  monthly  reports  to  the  Qudbcc  Ministry  ol  the  Environment  concerning  the  plants'
discharges ol' TSS and BOD during the month. Measures have to be taken at times and intervals
specified by the regulation. Se(l-monilo  ring is the most important source of information used by the
regulator to assess a plant's compliance with the standards. All the data used in this study have been
provided  by  the  Quebec  Ministry  of  the  Environment;  most  of  them  are  issued  from  the
Department's annual publication Bilans annuels  de coqformitd environmentale - secleur des pd/es et
papiers. These documents are based on the monthly reports of all mills of the province and contain
the mill's  monthly discharges of BOD and T'SS. The reports also indicate the allowable discharges
of each individual plant for each individual month.'t 9
As mentioned above, a large number of observations are missing from the monthly reports
filed by the plants of the industry. A natural and important question arises as to whether these are
missing  in a random or systematic manner. In the former case, estimation can proceed in a  fairly
straightforward manner with the missing observations smoothed over in an appropriate way. On the
other hand, if there is a systematic pattern to the non-reporting, this can lead to a selection bias in
the usual least squares estimates. After an examination of the data, we decided to divide the missing
observations into two categories. In a number of cases, some of the plants had neglected to report
their  emission  levels  on  a  few  occasions  in  what  seemed  to  be  an  unsystematic  way.  These
observations  were treated as randomly missing  and were replaced by forecasts  from  12-th order
univariate autoregressions. This left us with a data set including information on 46 of the 59 plants.
,x  in the United States, the regulation set a limit  per pound of pulp and paper nroduced.
Then, the total  amount of BOD that a plant can discharge on any given day is obtained
by multiplying  the limit by the total number of pounds of pulp and paper the plant
produces  on that day. It appears difficult to compare the Quebec emissions standard to their
American counterpart since they were defined very differently. In particular, in Qudbec,
allowable discharges were defined for each and every stage of production, from wood
washing (whether  it be logs or  wood chips) to the mnaking  of the final product. They also
varied according to the production  process. However, interviews with the Qudbec Ministry
of the  Environment suggest that  the allowable discharges per ton of output in Quebec
and the United States were practically the same.
9  The reports also indicate the monthly production of each plant. However, this information is
confidential.  Moreover,  given  the  complexity  with  which  allowable  discharges  are
calculated, it is not possible to find out what was the output production in any given period
from knowing what was the allowable discharges for that same period.
8Ihis dala  set was used to)  estimiailte  the eflbect  of'  inspectionis without controlling  fhr samiiple  selectioni
issues. '['lic 13 reimiainilng  piants hlid lihiled  to report their  emissions to sucih  an extent that it was not
evei  possible  to smooth  these over  witlh autoregressions.  I'lhese  were treated  als possibly  imlissinlg  in
a nonranidonm  miainner.  th1us  leuding to a sample sceltion  problem. 'I'is  issue w;11  be discussed  in
mlorc detail  below.
In addition to iltose  in thc regulat measurements  carried out by eacih  planit, emissionis are
also  mcastired during  thc  periodic  sampling  inspections coniducted by the regulator.  Inspections
consist  of  (I)  the  regulator  and  the  producer  each  taking  samples  from  thc mill's  eflluents,  (2)
mcasuring their *FSS  and  BOD  conitents, and  (3) comparing  thesc measures  witli the applicable
slandards.21'1 'lhe  i Qudhcc  Ministry ol  thc Environment perlormed  54 sampling  inspections  from
1985 to 1990. 1  lowever, since 13 plants are excludcd from our initial sample of analysis, only 47 of
these inspectionis  are initially accounited for.
Belore  presenting  our model.  some descriptive statistics  are of  intercst. These  appear  in
Table  1. Note  first that tile avwrage production of both BOD and TSS is above the norm.  In fact,
37.38%  of the self-reported  discharges of TSS are above the norm (35.75%  for BOD).  In MV's
sample of  analysis, the occurrencc of reported violations  for BOD  is 25.2%. Note  also  that the
unconditional  probability of inspections in any given month is 0.0148, or approximately  1.5%. In
MV, this probability  is approximately  4.25% so that the probability of an inspection  is almost 3
times higher in MV's sample. Variables of the form PRODi (i = 1,....5) represent dummy variables
for the plant's type of production. Newsprint is by far the most important good produced by these
plants.  hliese  will be used to  reflect that plants have different operations and technology.  Finally,
variables of the form REGi  (i =.8)  are dummy variables  for the region in  which the plant is
located.
A question which naturally arises with self-reporting is whether the plants accurately report
their emissions  levels. To some extent, this is an unresolvable  problem and the results  should be
interpreted  conditional  on  the fact  that  the reporting  was  conducted  by  the  plants  themselves.
However,  there  are  several  reasons  to  expect  that  the  reported  emissions  are  not  completely
inaccurate. First, the technology  used by the plants is by now well-knowrn  and has been used for a
relatively long period of time. Hence, knowing the precise technology used by any given plant, its
actual production, and the waste water treatment facilities it is using, relatively good estimates of its
pollution  load can  be obtained.  Second.  it should  be  noted that  fraud in  reporting  is a  serious
criminal offence. Third, our discussions with various parties indicate that unionised employees  are
very prone to inform the regulator about a  plant's  wrongdoing with respect to the management  of
its waste. Finally, at the same time as a sampling inspection takes place, plants are also required to
perform a sampling, independently of thoF? usually conducted for their monthly reports. Given the
presence of an inspector, one would therefore expect the plants' measurements of BOD and TSS to
20  It  is  important  to  recognize  that  the purpose  of  an  inspection  is not  to  detennine  the
accuracy of previous reports. This is technically impossible to do since the TSS and BOD
discharges of previous months have "disappeared" from the mill's vicinity.
9Ie  LIccullilC  101i) i[  IeaslI  IIIOSC S&tiiplings.  'Thiis  prvides  an  additional  source  of  inforniation  regarding
1he  IILCliIricy ol' their  reporls.  We thltis  conlulcted paircd  dilThrencc of menscs  tcsts using,  as a
measure ol' reportinig  zccuraLrley.  1  difTl'crenee  lbtweeni tlhe  plants' loud measured in presencie of uw
inspector  andli  televels  indicatecl  oni  the mothlily  repirts Ilfr iliat  samei  period. 21 As indicated  in
liblc  2. the resLultilg  test  statistics do nol inidicate  ally syste:matic lailsilicaLtion  ol rcsults.  2
111)  MODE)LS  ANI) REStJLTS
In tihis section, we proceed in thrce steps. First, we discuss least squarcs estimates of  the
basic  m)odel  to  examine  the  efTects of  inspections  without  controlling  cithcr  ror  possible
cndogencity o* the inspections or  possible selection biascs (section (A)). Second, we allow and test
kor the  possibility  that  currcnt  inspections  arc  endogcnous.  and  then  cstimatc  our  model  by
instr umental variables (section (B)). In both of thcse sections, thc estimates are calculatcd using the
data lor the 46 plants whose reports were basically complete. Finally, we tcst for the possibility that
the process governing non-reporting may not be random, and then modify our model as suggested
by Heckman  (1979). In this last section  (section  (C)). we also allow inspections  to be endogenous.
(A) Irhe bnasic  model
Our objective  is to  test for  the impact of  inspections  on  two  sets  of  variables:  (1) the
absolute discharges of BOD and TSS and (2) the level of discharges of BOD and TSS relative to
their respective standards. The basic model we estimate is of the same form regardless of the
pollution variable  of interest. Let Pi, denote the pollution variable associated  with plant i in period
i.. 23 In the absence of sample selection corrections, the equations estimated are of the  following
forn:
12
P, 1 - a  +  ,32 0-12+0  INS, +Z:o  .INSt.j+  1  2 REGi+  P  3PRODi  +  P 4CAP  +y  t+c,1 (1)
i=]1..46;tl=  ,..60
The  first variable  is the  plant's  lagged value of  pollution.  This  variable  is included  to  capture
potential seasonal effects, which may be strong (especially for BOD) in Quebec with important
variations of temperature  between summer  and winter. This variable also reflects the fact that the
21  For example, if an inspection took place in May, we would compare the plant's  measure
from the sample taken by the inspector  with the load reported by the plant for the month
of May.
22  It should be said that this is a very simple measure of reporting  accuracy  that would not be
an accurate measure under a number of scenarios.
23  In some specifications,  P 1 , is the absolute discharges while in others, it is the discharges in
excess of  the norm.
10installation  of emissions control  equipment  typically  requires  a long time.  To this extent, the lagged
pollution variable could also be interpreted as a proxy for the production technology. I-ence, we
would expect that the (12-month) lagged value of pollution to be a good explanatory  variable for
current pollution. 24 The second  group of variable reflects the efTect  of current inspections and
indicate whether the plant was inspected  in period t. The third group of variables indicate  whether
the plant was inspected in period t-j. An empirical  question  concems the appropriate number  of lag
lengths to include in the analysis. When we included four lags in the model, the corresponding
coefficient estimates were generally negative, of the same magnitude and statistically significant.
However, as a  referee pointed out, to test whether the efflects  of inspections are persistent, it is
preferable to include also less recent inspections. With twelve lagged inspections, the estimates
were still generally  negative and of the same size, but the individual  coefficients  had small t-ratios.
To circumvent this problem, we then conducted Wald tests to see whether we could reject the
hypothesis  that the coefficients  were equal. Since we were unable to reject this hypothesis  for each
of the models, we have imposed this constraint on the coefficients of lagged inspections. The
resulting point estimates are substantially  sharper and, in fact, yield considerable  evidence that the
effects of inspections  are persistent,  if not permanent.
REG and PROD are 8 X I and 5 X  I vectors of dummy variables reflecting the plant's
location and type of output. 25 The CAP variable  indicates  plant i's daily productive  capacity at time
t. It should  be noted that plants periodically  change their productive  capacities,  and this is in fact the
case in the sample period. Plants with higher capacities should produce higher levels of pollution.
However, it is important to remember that allowable  discharges  are also a function of output and
consequently,  higher levels of pollution do not necessarily  imply that a plant is more likely to be
out of  compliance. The final variable allows  for a time trend in pollution emissions. Using
quarterly data, MV have instead  used a set of quarterly  dummy variables and report that there was
no interesting pattern in the results. With monthly data, a similar procedure leads to an important
loss in the degrees of freedom and so we used a simple linear time trend.  Moreover,  a time trend
has a straightforward  interpretation,  namely the overall trend in pollution emissions in the absence
of inspections.  MV reports having regressed  absolute level of discharges  against a linear time trend
and found no significant  relationship.  As shown  below, this is not so in our case.
The results from these estimates are presented in Table 3. There are four sets of results
corresponding  to the four measures  of pollution emissions.26  First note that the coefficient  on the
twelve-month lagged dependent variable is, as  expected, positive and has a  strong effect on
absolute discharges, especially so for BOD.  MV obtained a similar result for BOD. Second, the
coefficients on current and past inspections  are always negative, although not always statistically
significant. This is especially the case when discharges are measured relative to the norm. This
24  We have also experimented  with other lag lengths.  It had little effect  on the overall results.
25  For identification, REG9 and PROD6 are left out of the estimated models.
26  These  equations  were estimated separately. We  also  computed seemingly unrelated
regression.  The results were very similar.
11suggests that  the means by which BOD  and TSS emissions are reduced also have an impact on the
norm. 27 MV lound that  each inspection  reduces the mean value of absolute BOD discharges by
approximately  20%. Our results indicate  that lagged  inspections  reduce  absolute discharges  of BOD
by approximately 7%. Significant  coefficients  on regions (especially  on REG, and REG 2) indicate
that there might be important regional differences in the nature of the relationship that exists
between the regulator and the regulatees  and/or the monitoring and enforcement  procedure across
regions.  As expected, other things being equal, plants with larger capacity should have higher
levels of absolute discharges, but need not be out of  compliance. The statistically significant
negative  coeflicient  on time indicates  that once the impact  of inspections  is accounted  for, there is a
trend for both pollution discharges  and discharges  relative to the norm to fall over time. This is in
contrast to the results reported  by MV.
(B) Endogenous  inspections
The most obvious question which arises in the context of this study concems the possible
endogeneity  of inspections  and the consequent  impact  on the least squares estimates.  If inspections
are endogenous and corrclated with the same variables which determine  current pollution levels,
then the least squares estimates  will be biased in general.  To put this another way, it may not be
contemporaneous  inspections  which have an effect on effluent  levels so much as the probability of
an inspection.  To control for this (and to identify  the resulting  parameters),  it is necessary  to model
the  inspections using some variables which do  not enter  the  basic model.  Interviews with
employees of the Quebec Ministry of the Environment  indicate that inspections  are motivated by
two considerations. First, plant size seems to be a factor: smaller plants are less likely to  be
inspected  than larger plants. Moreover, plants which make changes to their productive capacities
are more likely to be inspected. Second,  there seems to be an effort to visit as many plants as
possible. In other words, the plants to be inspected  in any given period do not appear  to be chosen
randomly. An obvious implication of this "sampling without  replacement" strategy is that a plant
knows that, all things  being equal,  the probability  of an inspection  is inversely  related  to the number
of previous  visits.
It therefore  appears appropriate  to estimate an "inspections  equation" where inspections  are
a function of variables  in the basic pollution  equation  as well as a variable  indicating  the number  of
inspections  which have been conducted  at the plant prior to  the current  period:
cumi1 =  XINSiT  (2)
T '  I(2
Since inspections  are a qualitative  variable,  a simple  way to model  inspections  is as the following:
INSi, =  1[S Xi,  >itj  i =  1,2....,46; t  =  1,2,...60  (3)
27  This would be the case if output were to fall as a result of inspections. Unfortunately,  we
are unable to substantiate  this possibility since we did not have access to plant's
production data.
12whcrc I I-] is the usual indicator  function,  Xi,  contains the variables  determining  inspections,  and Tjj,
is a variable which could capture, for example, some unobserved tolerance level above which an
inspection is conducted. For simplicity, we assumed that -qit  are identically and independently
distributed  normal random variables  so that equation  (3) is simply a probit model.  Table 4 provides
the results of this probit regression of inspections  on a constant, the number of past inspections,
capacity and a time trend.28  As far as inspections  are concerned,  it is interesting  to note that they
are not clumped together at the beginning  of the period, but rather seem first to decline and then
jump at the end of the period.29 As a result  of this, we made the inspections  equation quadratic in
the time trend variables.  The results confirm  what one could expect:  the probability  of an inspection
is a decreasing iunction of past inspections  and an increasing function of capacity. 30 Also, all
things being equal, the probability of being inspected  appcars to be increasing  over time. This can
be  interpreted as a  proxy for additional resources being committed over time to  monitoring
activities.
Given  this, it is sensible  to consider  testing  for the exogeneity  of current inspections.  In fact,
for three of the four Wald tests (see Table 5), exogeneity  of current inspections  is strongly  rejected
so that the least squares estimates of the parameters  in equation  (1) are most certainly  biased. This
being the case, it is instructive to consider the effeets of reestimating the model using the fitted
values from the inspections equation (3) and the other right hand side variables of equation (1)
(apart from current inspections)  as instmrnents.
The results appear in Table 6. With the exception  of  BOD emissions relative to the norm,
the coefficient  estimates  on current and lagged inspections  from the IV estimation  are all negative
and strongly significant.  Apart from being substantially  more significant,  note that the magnitude of
the coefficient on current inspections  is much larger when estimated with instrumental  variables.
This is attributable to the fact that with IV estimation, current inspections  (a discrete indicator
variable) are effectively replaced by the conditional probability of an inspection, which has a
smooth  distribution  and  takes  values  on  a much  shorter  interval.  The strongly  negative coefficient
estimates  on lagged  inspections  indicate  a persistent,  if not permanent,  effect from inspections.  The results now
indicate that past inspections  reduce absolute BOD discharges by approximately  28% (compared to 20% obtained
by MV). Since an altemative interpretation  of the IV estimates  is that inspections  in our basic model
(equation(l)) are replaced  by expected inspections,  it appears that the threat of an inspection  may
have most effect  on pollution emissions.  This is not to say that actual inspections  have no impact on
28  We also ran regressions  using the region and product indicators,  but these did not improve
the fit of the model.
29  The number of inspections  for each year in the data set is the following: 15 (1985); 9
(1986); 6 (1987); 8 (1988); 3 (1989); 13 (1990).
30  Estimates were also obtained using other variables such as previous pollution levels.
Results were not improved.
13a plant's  pollutioni control behaviour. But it does indicate that this beiaviour  is also a  function of
the probability  of beinig inispected. If the inspection strategy is dr..termined by  sampling  wvitlhout
replacement. then one may suggest that lagged inspections might have the opposite sign since once
the rcgulator  has come by once, the plant may (correctly) guess that  it will not come back  for a
large number  of periods. 3'  While  this is possible, it may also be the case that inspeclions  prompt changes in the
planl's  behavior Ihal  ar1c  of a permanent nature.  One  can  think  of numerous reasons  including  changes  in equipment,
emiployce  lunctions  and simple changes in the  employer  and employees awareness of the regulations.  The sign of
thcsc coeflicients  is therefore an empirical matter.  We find them to be significantly negative.
3 2 The other
coeflicient estimates are very similar to those when least squares were used.
(C) Missing data
As mentioned above, the exclusion of missing observations can result in a selection bias if
the filing of a report is in fact not a *andom event, leading to inconsistent parameter estimates. As a
first step in allowing for sample selection issues, we estimate a "reporting" equation to predict  the
probability  that  a plant  reports  its emissions  levels. Since we do have  some information  on the
plants even if  they do not report, we are able to compute a simple binary choice model of reporting
as a function of cumulated inspections, capacity, as well as a time trend (which is again specified as
quadratic). In other words we calculate the coefficients from a model written as the following:
REP,l  =  1[5 Xi,  >  j±ij,  i  =  l,2,...59;  t=  1,2,...60  (4)
Note that for these estimates the entire data on all 59 plants was used. This was estimated using a
probit  model, that is, assumning  that the gi,u  are nornally  distributed. The results for this regression
are  summarised  in  Table  7.  Note  that  cumulated  inspections  have  a  strong  positive  effect  on
reporting.  This  result  is  important in  itself  as it indicates an  important secondary  function  of
inspections in the reporting/monitoring process. It also seems clear that larger plants, having more
resources  at their disposal,  are more likely to  file their reports.  There  does not seem to  be  any
significant trend in report filing that is not captured by the CUMi  variable. 33 Overall it seems clear
that be  act of reporting is not  random, although  it is not  necessarily  clear  that this  is due  any
strategic planning on the part of the plants.
Having  estimated the parameters  in this equation  -we went  back to  the  subsample of  46
plants and augmented the basic model with a correction term as suggested by Heckman (1979). The
equation of interest becomes  the following:
3  1  This point was raised by one of the referees.
32  Note moreover that this effect is controlled for when equation  (1) is estimated by
instrumental variables  in which case current inspections is effectively  replaced by the
probability of an inspections given, amongst other things, cumulated past inspections.
33  In  fact,  when  REPi  was  regressed  only  on  CUMi, the  corresponding  coefficient  was
strongly significant.
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j-O
i  =  1,2,...,46;  t  1,2,...,60
where  Xi, =  + (6 Xi ,) / (D  Xi,). +  and (D are  the  standard normal density and  cumulative
distribution and e  denotes the probit estimate of 8. In this context a  serves as an estimate of
selection bias. Under the null hypothesis  that the data are missing in a random manner, ca  should
equal zero. This equation  was also estimated  using instrumental  variables. 34
With respect to  the effects of  inspections, in  all four cases the  instrumental variable
estimates of  the  coefficients on  inspections are  all  significantly negative, except for  BOD
discharges  relative to the norm as shown in Table 8.35 Moreover,  with the inclusion of a sample
selection correction, it is interesting to  note that the sign on the time  trend is negative and
statistically significant in 3 cases out of 4.  This may be evidence that, apart from inspection
inducements,  there is no effort  on the part of plants to reduce  their  emission levels.
IV)  CONCLUSION
Securing compliance with environmental  standards is a difficult task. Current monitoring
practices and enforcement initiatives (or the  lack thereof) have been increasingly criticised.
Regulators  are therefore experimenting  new approaches.
Because of limited  resources  and the resulting  need to establish  priorities, each EPA
program at agency headquarters in Washington, D.C. has developed compliance
monitoring plans and enforcement response policies. These stategies  generally
direct the most intensive  efforts to those segments  of the regulated  community most
likely  to be in non-compliance.  (Silverman,  1990)
Similarly  in Canada,
34  Consistent estimates of the standard errors in this case were obtained using the method
developed by White (1980). Once again, we constructed Wald tests for endogeneity of
current inspections.  Here, in all four cases, the test statistics  were large enough to reject the
exogeneity  of inspections.
35  Overall the inclusion of a sample selection correction led to much precise estimates as
evidenced  by the t-statistics.
15tJpon evaluating the results of the National Inspection Plan at the conclusion of the
1990-91 year,  EInvironment Canada found that all  regulations did  not require  the
same levcl of compliance  verification. and decided on a target-oriented approach.
(Canada, 1992)
Ilowever,  for such  an approach  to be effective,  one must  have a clear understanding  of plants'
pollution  control  behaviour.  Regulators  must  be  able  to  observe  characteristics  of  plants  and
industries and from these characteristics, predict whose "most likely to be in non-compliance".  In
particular, one needs to know how current monitoring practices affect  pollution behaviour and in
the light of this knowledge, re-allocate, if necessary, monitoring resources more efficiently.
We have shown evidence in this paper that both inspections and the threat of  inspections
have an impact of emissions.  We have also shown evidence that the decision to self-report level of
emissions is not random and that inspections improve the frequency of reporting. Once this effect is
taken into consideration,  the impact of inspections on emissions is even larger. These results have
direct  implication  on  the  allocation  of  scarce  monitoring  resources.  In  particular,  credibly
increasing  the  probability  of  inspections  can  induce  a  significant  change  in  plants'  pollution
behaviour.
The  quality  of  our  environment  crucially  depends  on  the  credibility  of  the  monitoring
activities and enforcement  actions practised by regulators. Along with Cropper and Oates (1992),
we do believe this to be an area of research "where economic analysis may make some quite useful
contributions" (p. 697).
16TABLE  1
DESCRIPTIVE  STATISTICS  OF SAMPLE
(Monthly data 1985:1 - 1990:12 for 46 plants)
Variable  Mean  Standard
deviation
Total Effluent  Production  47.309  49.5464
Total Suspended  Solids
Emissions  (TSS)  5.5386  6.1210
Standards  5.2679  4.0883
Biological  Oxygen  Demand
Emissions  (BOD)  19.2401  28.4372
Standards  18.4768  26.7975
Inspections  0.0148  0.1207
Violation  of TSS Standard  0.3738  0.4839
Violation  of BOD Standard  0.3575  0.4793
PROD  1 (1= Kraft Pulp)  0.1957  0.3968
PROD2  (1  = Newsprint)  0.4130  0.4925
PROD3  (1= Recycled  Pulp)  0.0652  0.2469
PROD4  (1  = Office Paper)  0.0217  0.1459
PROD5  (1  = Chemical  Pulp)  0.1522  0.3592
PROD6 (1 =  Other)  0.1522  0.3592
REGI (1=  located  in region 1)  0.1087  0.3113
REG2  0.1304  0.3368
REG3  0.1522  0.3592
REG4  0.2174  0.4125
REG5  0.0652  0.2469
REG6  0.1087  0.3113
REG7  0.1087  0.3113
REG8  0.0652  0.2469
REG9  0.0435  0.2040
Capacity  of Production  15.8922  12.0868
17TABLE 2
PAIRED DIFFERENCE OF MEANS TESTS
BOD  TSS
Mean measurements  with regulator
present  19.1593  8.2632
Mean self-reported  measurements,
regulator  absent  19.0697  6.6543
Difference  0.0896  1.6089
t-difference  0.10230952  0.2144231
18TABLE  3
EMISSIONS  EQUATIONS
ORDINARY  LEAST  SQUARES'
(Sainplc  size - 2716)
Independent  Absolute  dicharges  Discharges  relative  to  norm
Variables
BOD  TSS  BOD  TSS
CONSTANT  0.8783  3.6740  0.1063  2.1150
(0.6566)  (8.8756)  (0.0347)  (4.4517)
Pi.t-12  0.8144  0.4228  0.1511  0.4196
(80.812)  (33.796)  (8.0051)  (31.199)
INS,  -4.6976  -0.5796  -2.5810  -0.7632
(-2.9283)  (-1.1704)  (-0.7014)  (-1.3377)
INS;  -1.3115  -0.6413  -1.0186  -0.4082
(-2.5466)  (-4.0472)  (-0.8648)  (-2.2364)
PROD,  0.9211  1.9236  -2.0380  1.1488
(1.0119)  (6.7883)  (-0.9758)  (3.5403)
PRO')2 1.3253  1.3577  1.9298  0.6156
(1.4742)  (4.8576)  (0.9373)  (1.9234)
PROD3  8.5664  3.6086  19.270  2.0956
(6.3952)  (9.0274)  (6.7732)  (4.6436)
PROD4  0.3520  0.3841  0.5537  -0.0703
(0.2582)  (09127)  (0.1771)  (-0.1450)
PROD 5 -0.1381  0.0784  0.9640  0.1465
(-0.1869)  (0.3439)  (0.5688)  (0.5579)
REG,  -4.6449  -5.4594  -8.4068  -3.0172
(-3.2435)  (-12.392)  (-2.6303)  (-6.0522)
REG 2 -3.8455  -3.5180  -6.3141  -1.5032
(-3.0151)  (-8.9461)  (-2.1723)  (-3.3394)
REG 3 -0.4137  -2.5488  -1.7323  -1.1595
(-0.3340)  (-6.6878)  (-0.6118)  (-2.6440)
REG 4 -0.1182  -3.3124  3.3458  -1.6605
(-0.0989)  (-8.9735)  (1.2239)  (-3.9180)
REGs  -1.2703  -3.3482  -1.3965  -1.8530
(-0.8952)  (-7.6601)  (-0.4308)  (-3.6891)
REG 6 -0.5655  -2.6949  1.0118  -1.4283
(-O.4162)  (-6.4467)  (0.3258)  (-2.9672)
REG 7 -1.7044  -3.8094  -1.6109  -2.4143
(-1.3197)  (-9.6178)  (-0.5489)  (-5.3086)
REGs  1.0611  -3.2194  2.7014  -1.5990
(0.7671)  (-7.5468)  (0.8522)  (-3.2504)
CAP  5.9976  4.0212  3.0602  -0.5524
(7.5076)  (17.105)  (1.9065)  (-2.2230)
TIME  -1.7881  -1.7016  -3.8478  -1.7560
(-2.8668)  (-8.7511)  (-2.6881)  (-7.8269)
R 2 0.891  0.720  0.115  0.370
The dependent  variable  is the appropriate  pollution  variable  divided  by 1000.
19TABLE 4
INSPECTIONS  EQUATION
(Sample size = 2716)
Independent  variaibles  Coefflcient  t-stats
CONSTANT  -2.5442  -10.586
ci'M,  -0.1956  -1.912
CAP 1,  0.5955  3.525
lIME  -0.7887  -0.844
l'IME2  1.2067  1.400
IJ(i-lI .IK11.11  I(X)I) -1ST  STMIiTIICS:
17.345
20TABLE 5
WALD SPECIFICATION  TEST
FOR EXOGENEITY  OF CURRENT  INSPECTIONS
(Sample size = 2716)
Variables  Value of Wakl's
statistic






INSTRUMENTAL  VARIAP4J,E  ESTMATION'
(samplc  siwj  =  'b)
Independent  Absolute dicharges  Discharges  relative to norm
Variables
BOD  TSS  BOD  TSS
CONSTANT  6.5776  4.9203  1.6032  3.7160
(1.6989)  (5.4476)  (0.4309)  (3.2848)
PU, 1 2 0.8198  0.4116  0.1524  0.3946
(32.854)  (17.579)  (7.7901)  (13.816)
INS,  -193.40  -40.402  -51.927  -52.318
(-2.8843)  (-2.5961)  (-0.8032)  (-2.6467)
INS. X  -5.3703  -1.5054  -2.0836  -1.5240
(-2.7960)  (-3.3786)  (-1.1268)  (-2.7116)
PROF),  3.2633  2.4485  -1.4241  1.8301
(1.3620)  (4.3735)  (-0.6188)  (2.6148)
PROD 2 2.6024  1.6674  2.2683  1.0202
(1.1488)  (3.1582)  (1.0446)  (1.5480)
PROD 3 6.3182  3.3143  18.725  1.7864
(1.8573)  (4A550)  (6.1936)  (1.9610)
PROD 4 -0.0397  0.3026  0.4529  -0.1917
(-0.0118)  (0.3908)  (0.1401)  (-0.1973)
PROD,  -1.2867  -0.1679  0.6605  -0.1719
(-0.6885)  (-0.3904)  (0.3681)  (-0.3186)
REG,  -10.294  -6.7833  -9.91  33  -4.7418
(-2.5331)  (-7.0605)  (-2.5791)  (-3.9634)
REG2 -6.5861  -4.1565  -7.0414  -2.3073
(-1.9986)  (-5.4348)  (-2.2365)  (-2.4234)
REG3  -5.4460  -3.6407  -3.0557  -2.5434
( 1.5380)  (-4.4394)  (-0.8993)  (-2.4809)
REG 4 -5.3100  -4.4456  1.9752  -3.1003
(-1.5268)  (-5.4882)  (0.5907)  (-3.0648)
REG 5 -6.0546  -4A013  -2.6602  -3.1937
(-1.5554)  (-4.8760)  (-0.7126)  (-2.8294)
REG6 -7.0729  4.0936  -0.7028  -3.2133
(-1.7369)  (-4.3426)  (-0.1796)  (-2.7205)
REG7 -8.4692  -5.2892  -3.3973  -4.3181
(-2.1223)  (-5.6912)  (-0.8879)  (-3.7032)
REG8 -3.2430  -4.1279  1.5830  -2.7202
(-0.8669)  (-4.7956)  (0.4416)  (-2.5326)
CAP  6.9972  4.3558  3.3644  -0.2397
(3.4841)  (9.6463)  (1.9739)  (-0.4686)
TIME  -0.2092  -1.3085  -3.3238  -1.2794
(-0.1234)  (-3.3634)  (-2.0401)  (-2.6396)
0.555  0.379  0.077  0.068
The dependent variable is the appropriate pollution variable divided by 1000.
22TABLE 7
NONRANDOM REPORTING EQUATION
(Sampic  size = 3496)
Independent variables  Coefficient  t-stats
CONSTANT  0.4720  4.959
CUMPt  0.3859  6.443
CAPi,  1  .5473  13.159
TIME  0.6967  1.689
TIME 2 -0.8375  -2.127
LOG-LIKELIHOOD  TEST





INSTRUMENTAI,  VARIABLE  ESTIMATION]
(Sample  size - 2716)
Independent  Absolute dileIarges  Vischargeie relative  to norm
Variables
DOD  TSS  WOD  TSS
CONS1'ANT  5.4537  4.4666  1.7141  3.3552
(0.8149)  (2.9382)  (0.5576)  (1.8645)
Pu- 1 2 0.8191  0.4095  0.1524  0.3922
(23.058)  (8.8315)  (1.2871)  (7.4'nI)
INS,  -210.21  -47.558  -50.218  -58.061
(-1.8784)  (-1.9156)  (-0.8589)  (-'.9095)
INS..  -5.5509  -1.5839  -2.0651  -1.5872
(-2.4181)  (-2.9996)  (-1.5643)  (-2.5080)
PROD,  3.6189  2.6050  -. 4602  1.9546
(1.4040)  (4.2949)  (-0.4645)  (2.6977)
PROD 2 3.0048  1.8396  2.2286  1.1570
(1.2620)  (3.2905)  (1.2262)  (I.6884)
PROD 3 6.1961  3.2663  18.742  1.7517
(1.9968)  (4.3360)  (4.5815)  (1.9357)
PROD 4 -0.1722  0.2466  0.4663  -0.2378
(-0.4125)  (2.0029)  (1.5022)  (-1.6863)
PROD 5 -1.3209  -0.1836  0.6641  -0.1846
(-1.0410)  (-0.6257)  (0.8492)  (-0.5232)
REG,  -10.558  -6.9048  -9.8891  -4.8390
(-1.6845)  (-4.8202)  (-2.9635)  (-2.9306)
REG 2 -6.6477  -4.1878  -7.0363  -2.3298
(-1.1857)  (-3.2960)  (-2.6874)  (-1.5842)
2EG3 -5.9189  -3.8413  -3.0088  -2.7011
(-0.9838)  (-2.8705)  (-1.0849)  (-1.7143)
REG 4 -5.7143  -4.6209  2.0158  -3.2379
(-0.9576)  (-3.4598)  (0.6825)  (-2.0671)
REG 5 -6.1659  -4.4537  -2.6493  -3.2339
(-1.0384)  (-3.3582)  (-0.8748)  (-2.0807)
KEG 6 -7.7194  -4.3666  -0.6382  -3.4294
(-1.1948)  (-3.0655)  (-0.2054)  (-2.0291)
REG 7 -8.8416  -5.4508  -3.3605  -4.4467
(-1.4084)  (-3.8940)  (-1.0930)  (-2.7076
REG 2 -3.2857  -4.1539  1.5888  -2.7367
(-0.5512)  (-3.1591)  (0.5303)  (-1.7704)
CAP  8.1369  4.8395  3.2522  0.1314
(2.6350)  (6.0190)  (2.4415)  (0.1652)
TIME  0.4036  -1.2298  -3.3438  -12188
(0.2233)  (-2.8422)  (-3.2572)  (-2.3644)
RANDOM  4.3839  1.8109  -0.4348  1A387
(0.8985)  (1.4787)  (-0.0664)  (0.9963)
0.519  0.321  0.079  0.058
The dependent  varable is the appropriate  pollution  vaiable divided  by 1000.
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